Retail Installment Sales and Revolving Credit Acts: Missouri Constitution Article III, Section 44 by Anderson, Edmond R., Jr.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 25 
Issue 3 June 1960 Article 2 
1960 
Retail Installment Sales and Revolving Credit Acts: Missouri 
Constitution Article III, Section 44 
Edmond R. Anderson Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edmond R. Anderson Jr., Retail Installment Sales and Revolving Credit Acts: Missouri Constitution Article 
III, Section 44, 25 MO. L. REV. (1960) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES AND REVOLVING
CREDIT ACTS: MISSOURI CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE III, SECTION 44
EDMOND R. ANDERSON, JR.*
In 1935, Indiana enacted the first comprehensive Retail Instalment
Sales Act,1 "An act to license and regulate and to promote competition in
the business of purchasing contracts arising out of retail instalment sales,
to prescribe the form of such contracts, to empower the department of
financial institutions to classify retail instalment sales and contracts arising
therefrom and to fix and prescribe maximum charges for the extension of
credit in retail instalment sales. ' 2 Today at least the following 30 states
have statutes of this general type: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Flor-
ida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah and Wisconsin.3
These statutes can be classified according to their application into four
basic types: "all goods"--applicable generally to retail sales of all ordinary
tangible personal property, "motor vehicles"-applicable only to retail sales
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. IND. ANN. STAT. 38 58-901 to -934 (1951).
2. Ind. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 231, at 1206; cf. IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-901 (1951).
3. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1801-1812.9, 2981-2982.5 (Supp. 1959); COLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. H3 13-16-1 to -10 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. 83 36-254 to -263;
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 520.01-.13, 520.30-.42 (Supp. 1959); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121V2,
§§ 223-53 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT. 88 58-901 to -934 (1951); IowA CODE
ANN. §§ 322.1-.26; Kan. Spec. Sess. 1958, ch. 9, §§ 1-15; Ky. REV. STAT.
§§ 190.010-.990 (1959); LA. REv. STAT. 33 6-951 to -964 (Supp. 1959); ME. REv.
STAT. ch. 59, §§ 249-60 (Supp. 1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, H§ 128-53, 154-65
(1957); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 255B, §§ 1-24 (Supp. 1959); MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 23.628(1)-.628(40) (1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 168.66-.77 (Supp. 1959);
MIss. CODE ANN. §3 8075-01 to -24 (Supp. 1958); MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. §3
74-601 to -612 (Supp. 1959); Neb. Laws 1959, chs. 215, 216, 217, §§ 1-3, ch. 218, §§
1-13; NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 97.010-.060 (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:16B-1
to -12 (1950); N.M. STAT. ANN. §H 50-15-1 to -12, 61-8-15 to -17 (Supp. 1959);
N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW H§ 301-12, 401-19 (1959); N.D. Laws 1959, ch. 350, § 1-5,
ch. 352, §§ 1-7; OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1317.01-.99 (Baldwin 1959); ORE. REV.
STAT. 33 83.510-.990 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 601-37 (Supp. 1958); S.D.
Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 241, H8 1-16; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1901 to 1910 (Supp.
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of motor vehicles,4 "all goods other than motor vehicles" and "revolving
credit."' Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nebras-
ka, New Jersey, New Mexico,6 North Dakota, Ohio and Utah have "all
goods" acts of one kind or another. California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississip-
pi, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota
and Wisconsin have "motor vehicles" acts. California, Florida, New York
and Tennessee have "all goods other than motor vehicles" acts. And, Cali-
fornia, Florida, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Ohio and Tennessee
have "revolving credit" acts, alone or in combination with one of the other
acts.
Typical provisions in any of these acts require a disclosure of the credit
terms and transactions. There must be a written contract. The buyer is en-
titled to a copy, and a number of the acts provide stringent requirements as
to any acknowledged receipt of the copy. Some of the recently enacted acts
contain requirements that certain provisions in installment sales contracts
4. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 301(1) (1959) defines "'motor vehicle"' as
"any device propelled or drawn by any power other than muscular power, upon
or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a
public highway, road or street." S.D. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 241, § 1(d) defines
"'motor vehicles, new and used'" to "include automobiles, motor trucks, motor-
cycles, house trailers, trailer-coaches, cabin trailers, semi-trailers, trailers, road
tractors, farm tractors, farm machinery mounted upon, drawn by, or attached to
farm tractors, and all vehicles with any power, other than muscular power, except,
however, any vehicles which run only on rails."
5. Consolidated Dry Goods Co. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 878, 879 (D.
Mass. 1960):
The Cycle Budget Account Plan is a typical example of what is known
in the merchandising field as a revolving credit plan. Under this plan the
store by agreement with the customer establishes a credit limit for the
customer, generally fixed at six times the monthly payments which it is
determined the customer is able to pay. The customer may then purchase
merchandise on credit up to this limit. The customer agrees to make the
fixed monthly payment each month (together with a service charge of one
per cent of the unpaid balance) so long as there remains any unpaid
balance on the account. When a customer has made purchases up to the
credit limit, no further purchases can be made on the account until the
unpaid balance is reduced. Whenever the unpaid balance is less than the
credit limit, the customer may make further purchases on credit until the
credit limit is reached. If in any month charges are made to the account
in excess of the credit limit, the customer at his next monthly payment
must pay this excess in addition to the regular monthly payment.
The revolving credit plan seems to have first been used about 1938
and the use of plans of this general type by retail stores has become wide-
spread since World War II . . ..
6. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-8-15 to -17 (Supp. 1959) applies only to sales of
personal property secured by "chattel mortgage, conditional sales contract or other
instrument retaining title in the former owner .... "
(Vol. 25
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appear in bold type or 8 point or 10 point type, that all blanks must be filled
in by the seller before the buyer signs, that certain statements permitting
early payment with a refund or avoidance of the unearned portion of the
time sale charge appear in a conspicuous place, etc. The contract must show
the cash sale price of the goods purchased, the time sale price, the amount of
any official fees or documentary costs, the cost of any insurance taken out
by the seller, the amount of the buyer's down payment, if any, the principal
balance due, the time charge or time price differential, the number of in-
stallment payments to be made, the due date or schedule for payments and
the amount of each required payment.
A number of the acts require licensing. Usually only those engaged in
the business of "sales finance company"7 or "financing institution"s need be
licensed. Banks, trust companies, investment companies and similar financiers,
otherwise licensed, are generally exempt from this required licensing. Criminal
penalties are provided for violation of the licensing requirement. 9
Most of the acts contain provisions as to the handling of insurance,
delinquency and collection charges, receipts for payments made, refunds or
credit for prepayment, additions to and consolidations of installment sales
contracts and repossession of the goods and redemption.
"Revolving credit" acts contain special provisions relating to required
7. Kan. Spec. Sess. 1958, ch. 9, § 2(m) and MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 74-
602(m) (Supp. 1959):
'Sales finance company' means a person engaged, in whole or in part, in
the business of purchasing retail installment contracts from one or more
sellers .... The term shall not include a person who makes only isolated
purchases of retail installment contracts, which purchases are not being
made in the course of repeated and successive purchases of retail install-
ment contracts from the same seller.
8. S.D. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 241, § 1(g):
'Financing institution' as used herein means a person engaged in the busi-
ness of creating and holding or purchasing or acquiring retail installment
contracts from a retail seller ... provided, however, that a retail seller...
who holds retail installment contracts of less than fifty thousand dollars
($50,000.00) in the aggregate originating from retail installment transac-
tions made by such retail seller . . . shall not be classified as a financing
institution ....
9. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16B-9 (1950) and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-15-11
(Supp. 1959) provide for a fine of not more than $500; MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. §
74-611 (Supp. 1959), fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more
than 6 months, or both; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 168.75 (Supp. 1959), fine of not more
than $500 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both; MicH. STAT. ANN.
§ 23.628(37) (1957), fine of not more than $5000 or imprisonment for not more
than 3 years, or both; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 637 (Supp. 1958), fine of $500 to
$5000 or imprisonment from 6 months to 3 years, or both.
19601
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periodic statements to be furnished the buyer by the seller or holder10 of the
account. These statements, furnished monthly or for whatever regular period
agreed upon, must show the unpaid balance at the beginning or end of the
period, some identification of the goods sold and the cash prices therefor,
payments made by the buyer and any other credits due the buyer, the
amount of the credit service charge and its percentage rate equivalent and
a legend to the effect that the buyer may at any time pay his total in-
debtedness. 1'
Probably the most important provisions in these acts relate to allow-
able limits or maximum rates for time sale charges.12 Different maximum
rates generally appear for sales of motor vehicles than for other goods, the
rates for motor vehicles being established for classes of sales based upon the
age of the vehicle, and the rates for other goods being dependent upon the
amount of the time sale price or the principal balance due." The unusual acts
10. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 47-1907 (Supp. 1959):
Transfer of contracts.-Any retail seller may assign, pledge, hypothecate,
or otherwise transfer a retail installment contract or retail charge agree-
ment to any person, firm or corporation on such terms and conditions and
for such price as may be mutually agreed upon. No filing of the assign-
ment, no notice to the buyer, and no requirement that the seller be de-
prived of dominion over payments upon the contract or agreement, or
over the goods, if title thereto or a lien thereon has been retained by the
seller, shall be necessary to the validity of such assignment or transfer as
against creditors, subsequent purchasers, pledgees, mortgagees or encum-
brancers of the seller.
11. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1810.5 (Supp. 1959); Neb. Laws 1959, ch. 217, § 2(2);
N.Y. PEas. PRoP. LAw § 413(4) (1959); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 47-1904 (Supp. 1959).
12. The Colorado, Illinois and New Jersey acts contain no provisions relating
to allowable rates.
13. Neb. Laws 1959, ch. 218, § 5:
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the time price dif-
ferential shall not exceed the following schedule:
(a) As to motor vehicles:
CLAss 1. Any new motor vehicle designated by the manufacturer by a
year model not earlier than the year in which the sale is made-eight
dollars per one hundred dollars per year.
CLASs 2. Any new motor vehicle not in Class 1 and any used motor
vehicle designated by the manufacturer by a year model of the same or
not more than two years prior to the year in which the sale is made-ten
dollars per one hundred dollars per year.
CLASS 3. Any used motor vehicle not in Class 2 and designated by the
manufacturer by a year model not more than four years prior to the year
in which the sale is made-thirteen dollars per one hundred dollars per
year.
CLASS 4. Any used motor vehicle not in Class 2 or Class 3 and designated
by the manufacturer by a year model more than four years prior to the
year in which the sale is made-fifteen dollars per one hundred dollars per
year.
(b) As to goods other than motor vehicles: (i) On so much of the basic
(Vol. 25
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in Nevada,' 4 Ohio's and Utah,:8 provide a single maximum rate applicable to
all sales covered by the act. Separate allowable maximum rates are provided
for revolving credit, either a straight per cent per month on the outstanding
indebtedness from month to month,37 a variation thereof determined on
a median basis within certain indebtedness ranges,' 8 a series of rates de-
pendent upon the amount of the outstanding balance or a similar variation
thereof.19 A flat minimum charge is usually also provided.2 0 Civil penalties
time price as does not exceed three hundred dollars, twelve dollars per one
hundred dollars per year; (ii) if the basic time price exceeds three hundred
dollars, but is one thousand dollars or less, ten dollars per one hundred
dollars per year on that portion over three hundred dollars; arid (iii) if the
basic time price exceeds one thousand dollars, eight dollars per one hundred
dollars per year on that portion over one thousand dollars.
14. NEv. REv. STAT. § 97.040 (1957).
15. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1317.06 (Baldwin 1959).
16. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 15-1-2a(B)3 (1953).
17. Neb. Laws 1959, ch. 217, § 2:
(3) A revolving charge agreement may provide for, and a seller may then
charge, receive and collect, a service charge not exceeding a rate of one
and one half per cent per month computed on the unpaid balance under
the agreement from month to month, which need not be a calendar month,
or other regular period. Such service charge shall be computed on not
more than the unpaid balance at the beginning of the period for which the
statement is rendered.
18. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1904(c) (Supp. 1959):
Time Price Differential. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law
the seller and assignee under a retail charge agreement may charge, receive
and collect a time price differential which shall not exceed fifteen cents
(15c) per ten dollars ($10.00) per month, computed from month to
month (which need not be a calendar month) or other regular period, on
all amounts unpaid from time to time under the agreement. The time
price differential under the subsection (c) may be computed for all un-
paid balances within a range of not in excess of ten dollars ($10.00) on
the basis of the median amount within such range, if as so computed such
time price differential is applied to all unpaid balances within such range.
A minimum time price differential not in excess of seventy cents (70c)
per month may be charged, received and collected under each such agree-
ment.
19. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1810.4 (Supp. 1959):
Subject to the other provisions of this article the seller or holder of a re-
tail installment account may charge, receive and collect the service charge
authorized by this chapter. The service charge shall not exceed the follow-
ing rates computed on the outstanding balances from month to month:
(a) On so much of the outstanding balance as does not exceed one
thousand dollars ($1,000), 1% percent per month.
(b) If the outstanding balance is more than one thousand dollars
($1,000), 1 percent per month on the excess over one thousand dollars
($1,000) of the outstanding balance.
(c) If the service charge so computed is less than one dollar ($1)
for any month, one dollar ($1).
(d) The service charge may be computed on a schedule of fixed
amounts if as so computed it is applied to all amounts of outstanding
1960]
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are provided for willful violation of the maximum rate provisions. Typical
is the provision in the Kansas "all goods" act which bars "recovery of any
finance charge, delinquency or collection charge on the contract."21 Atypical
is the extreme provision in the Nebraska "all goods" act rendering the con-
tract "void and uncollectible" as to (1) the excessive portion of the time
price differential, (2) the first $1,000 of the authorized time price differential
and (3) the first $4000 of the principal.22
The acts providing allowable maximum rates usually expressly exclude
the application of other laws. 23 The intended reference is to the usury laws;
in fact the South Dakota act expressly excludes application of the usury
laws to transactions within the scope of that act.2 4 These acts take on a
function like the usury laws in protecting the purchaser in time sale trans-
actions.25 The traditional rule was that a seller could charge for his goods
whatever the market would stand, and thus his time sale price lawfully
might be a lot higher than his cash price despite mathematical inconsistency
with the usury laws. 26 A few recent cases have found certain installment
sales transactions violative of the usury laws. 27 Installment sales acts further
insulate time sale transactions from the usury laws. It has been suggested
that the Kansas "all goods" act, enacted at a special legislative session in
1958, arose out of the fear of sales financiers as to what the Supreme Court
balances equal to the fixed amount minus a differential of not more than
five dollars ($5), provided that it is also applied to all amounts of out-
standing balances equal to the fixed amount plus at least the same dif-
ferential.
20. Kan. Spec. Sess. 1958, ch. 9, § 8(b): "A minimum finance charge of fifteen
dollars ($15) may be charged on any retail installment transaction ...... Cf. notes
18 and 19 supra as to minimum charges for revolving credit.
21. Kan. Spec. Sess. 1958, ch. 9, § 11(b).
22. Neb. Laws 1959, ch. 218, § 11.
23. See notes 13 and 18 supra.
24. S.D. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 241, § 2.
25. Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc., 93 N.W.2d 690 (Minn. 1958).
26. In re Oakes, 267 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1959); Eisenberg v. Greene, 346 P.2d
60 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Langille v. Central-Penn Nat'l Bank, 156 A.2d 410 (Del.
1959); Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc., supra note 25; Bryant v. Securities Inv.
Co., 233 Miss. 740, 102 So. 2d 701 (1958); cf. Willard, Finance Charges or Time
Price Differential in Installment Sales-Usury?, 24 Mo. L. REv. 225 (1959).
27. Thompson v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 169 Neb. 377, 99 N.W.2d
761 (1959); State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 168 Neb. 298, 96
N.W.2d 55 (1959); Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802
(1957); Daniel v. First Nat'l Bank, 227 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955), rehearing denied,
228 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1956); cf. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Stanley, 177 F.
Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Willard, supra note 26.
[Vol. 25;
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of Kansas might do with a then pending installment sales finance case under
the usury laws.28
During the 1959 general session, the Missouri legislature had before it a
proposed "all goods other than motor vehicles" act, containing licensing, al-
lowable maximum rates and revolving credit provisions, and a separate pro-
posed "motor vehicles" act.29 Senate Committee Substitute for Senate Bill
No. 98, the proposed "all goods other than motor vehicles" act, contained
comprehensive provisions relating to the form and contents of retail time
contracts, consolidation of such contracts, exceptions relating to catalog and
mail order sales, insurance provisions, a schedule of allowable maximum rates
for time charges applicable to retail time contracts determined by the amount
of the unpaid balance ($12 per $100 per year up to $300, $10 per $100 per
year between $300-$1000 and $8 per $100 per year on all over $1000), sepa-
rate requirements as to retail charge agreements [revolving credit], a sepa-
rate schedule of allowable maximum rates for time charges under retail
charge agreements also determined by the amount of the unpaid balance (15c
per $10 per month up to $500 and 7y2c per $10 per month on that over $500),
refunds for prepayment of retail time contracts, agreements as to delinquency
and collection costs and criminal and civil penalties for violations with an
opportunity for the violator to legally purge himself of the violation within
10 days after being notified thereof. In this form, the bill passed the Senate
April 29, 1959 and was reported to the House,3° where, after second reading,
it was referred to the House Judiciary Committee on April 30.21 On May 27,
just four days before the end of the session, it was reported out of Committee
with a recommendation of "do pass," in the form of House Committee
Substitute for Senate Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 98.32 The
House Committee Substitute made some reduction in the allowable maximum
rates for time charges applicable to retail time contracts ($9 per $100 per
year up to $300, $8 per $100 per year between $300-$1000, and $7 per $100
per year on all over $1000), while leaving the rates applicable to retail charge
agreements as they were; added a $10 minimum charge which may be charged
28. Lind, Kansas Enacts New Time Sales Law: Caveat Venditor, 12 PERS.
F.L.Q. REP. 97, 99 (1959).
29. Both introduced by Senators Waters and Curtis.
30. SENATE QUICK REFERENCE DOCKET, SENATE BILLS, 1959, SENATE, 70rM
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 5.
31. HousE QUICK REFERENCE DOCKEr, SENATE BILLS, 1959, HOUSE OF REPRE-
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on time contracts in any event; made more stringent the civil penalties for
violations and eliminated the purging opportunity; and added extensive
licensing provisions requiring that all those engaged in the business of "financ-
ing institution" be licensed. "Financing institution" was defined as "a person
engaged in the business of purchasing or otherwise acquiring retail time con-
tracts or accounts under retail charge agreements from one or more sellers."
The bill as so modified apparently was not jammed through during the bed-
lam of the last four days of the session. An independent, separate Senate,
Bill No. 99, similarly providing for licensing, had failed to pass the Senate
on May 6, 1959.11
The separate "motor vehicles" act, Senate Committee Substitute for
Senate Bill No. 97, contained typical provisions, including required licensing
of those engaged in the business of a "sales finance company" and allowable
maximum rates for the time price differential according to a schedule of four
classes of time sales determined by the age of the vehicle ($7 per $100 per
year on a new vehicle made in the year sold, $10 per $100 per year on any
vehicle made before but not more than 2 years prior to year sold, $13 per
$100 per year on any vehicle made before 2 but not more than 4 years prior
to year sold, and $15 per $100 per year on any vehicle made more than 4
years prior to year sold). The bill passed the Senate April 15, 1959 and was
reported to the House.3 There after second reading, it was referred to the
House Judiciary Committee on April 30 (at the same time as No. 98, the
"all goods other than motor vehicles" bill) and apparently died in Com-
mittee.85
It is interesting to observe that the more complex "all goods other than
motor vehicles" bill, No. 98, fared better than the "motor vehicles" bill,
No. 97. At least No. 98 was reported out of the House Judiciary Committee
with a recommendation of "do pass." Key terms used in the two bills were
not the same; for instance No. 98 used the term "time charge" whereas No.
97 used "time price differential," and No. 98 required licensing of those en-
gaged in the business of "financing institution" whereas No. 97 required
licensing of those engaged in the business of "sales finance company." But
the major difference between the bills was in the determination of allowable
33. SENATE QuicK, REFERENCE DocxEr, SENATE BILLS, 1959, SENATE, 70(r
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 5.
34. Ibid.
35. House QUICK REFERENcE Docc-r, SENATE BILLS, 1959, HOUSE oF REP-
REsENTATrvEs, 70in GENERAL ASSEMBLY 10.
(Vol. 25
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maximum rates. No. 97 provided a schedule of four classes of time sales
determined by the age of the vehicle. This may have been thought to create
undue difficulty under the Missouri constitution.
The Missouri constitution, article III, section 44 provides:
Uniform interest rates.-No law shall be valid fixing rates of
interest or return for the loan or use of money, or the service or
other charges made or imposed in connection therewith, for any
particular group or class engaged in lending money. The rates of
interest fixed by law shall be applicable generally and to all lenders
without regard to the type or classification of their business.
The key language reads: "No law shall be valid fixing rates of interest or
return for the loan or use of money ... for any particular group or class en-
gaged in lending -money. The rates of interest fixed by law shall be applicable
generally and to all lenders . . . ." (Emphasis added.) There must be a law
and the forbidden "law" must be a legislative law or statute.36 It must fix
rates of interest for a particular group or class engaged in lending money,
and be other than applicable generally to all lenders.
Section 44 is the only section in article III under the heading "Limita-
tion on Legislative Power" declaring "No law shall be valid." All the other
sections are specifically directed only toward or against future legislative
action. They read: "The general assembly shall have no power to grant,"
"The general assembly shall not pass," "No local or special law shall be
passed" and the like.ar Section 44 alone applies to existing laws and is not
solely directed toward or against future laws. As will be further developed
below, section 44 apparently was aimed at the then existing Small Loan
Laws.88
36. Mo. CONsT. art. III is entitled "Legislative Department" and Sec. 44
appears under the heading "Limitation on Legislative Power."
37. Section 36 reads: "the general assembly shall have no power to divert"
and "All appropriations . . . by successive general assemblies shall be made"; Sec-
tion 37, "The general assembly shall have no power to contract"; Section 38, "The
general assembly shall have no power to grant"; Section 38(b), "The general
assembly shall provide" and "Any balance remaining . . . may be appropriated";
Section 39, "The general assembly shall not have power [to do certain things]";
Section 40, "The general assembly shall not pass"; Section 41, "The general assem-
bly shall not indirectly enact"; Section 42, "No local or special law shall be
passed"; Section 43, "The general assembly shall never interfere"; Section 45, "the
general assembly shall by law divide"; Section 46, "The general assembly shall
provide"; Section 47, "the general assembly shall appropriate"; and finally Section
48, "The general assembly may enact." Mo. CONST. art. III, §§ 36-48.
38. §§ 8150-71, RSMo 1939.
1960]
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The Missouri constitution, article III, section 40 provides: "The general
assembly shall not pass any local or special law ... (26) fixing the rate of
interest . . ." This prohibition also appears in the group "Limitation on
Legislative Power." It was in the 1875 Missouri constitution.,, Article III,
section 44 then must mean something different. Two provisions in the same
part of the constitution should not be construed to mean the same thing,
particularly when one was added at a later time. A law setting up a preferred
business position in a particular group or class from among many similarly
situated is a special law in Missouri within the meaning of article III,
section 40.40 This hardly differs from the first sentence of section 44: "No law
shall be valid fixing rates of interest . . . for any particular group or class
engaged in lending money." The key to the different effect of section 44 must
then lie in the second sentence: "The rates of interest fixed by law shall be
applicable generally and to all lenders without regard to the type or
classification of their business." Thus, as the caption for section 44 indicates,
it requires uniform interest rates that are applicable generally to all lenders.
Affirmative uniformity of law-fixed interest rates is commanded, nothing
more.
The constitutional convention, which drafted the 1945 constitution, ap-
parently devised article III, section 44 with the express intent to invalidate
the then existing Small Loan Laws,4 originally enacted in 1927, and to force
greater competition among lenders with resultant lower interest rates.4 2
Section 44 achieved this purpose. In Housethold Finance Corp. v. Shaffner,4
the Supreme Court of Missouri held the Small Loan Laws in conflict with
section 44. The vice in those laws was the establishment of a favored group
or class of licensed lenders empowered to charge higher rates of interest for
certain small loans (maximum $300). Other lenders, many similarly situated,
could not or did not procure licenses under those laws and thus were unable
to charge the more favorable higher rates. The absolute tie up between the
special license and the power to make small loans at the higher rate of in-
39. Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 53(20) (1875).
40. Hagerman v. City of St. Louis, 365 Mo. 403, 283 S.W.2d 623 (1955);
McKaig v. Kansas City, 363 Mo. 1033, 256 S.W.2d 815 (1953) (en banc); cf. ABC
Liquidators, Inc. v. Kansas City, 322 S.W.2d 876, 885 (Mo. 1959); Ross v. City
of Kansas City, 328 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. 1959).
41. See note 38 supra.
42. Gisler, Legal and Historical Background of Missouri Small Loan Problem,
16 Mo. L. REV. 207, 223-26 (1951).
43. 356 Mo. 808, 203 S.W.2d 734 (1947) (en banc).
(Vol. 25
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terest was crucial. The old Small Loan Laws simply did not effect uniformity
of law-fixed interest rates, applicable generally to all lenders.
The present Missouri Consumer Credit Law,44 enacted in 1951 over the
ashes of the defunct Small Loan Laws, has eliminated the absolute tie up
between the special license and the power to make small loans at the
favorable higher rate. "Any person, firm, or corporation" may make such
loans45 so long as certain formalities are complied with to protect the bor-
rower. Only lenders generally engaged in the business of making loans to in-
dividuals need be specially licensed.46 The law-fixed higher interest rates are
uniform and applicable generally to all lenders. The command'of article III,
section 44 is satisfied 47
The opinions in the Household Finance case further clarify the mean-
ing of article III, section 44. The court's opinion, per Judge Clark, makes
it clear the provision is not itself unconstitutional under the United States
Constitution.48 More important, the court pointed out that interpretation of
article III, section 44 is not dependent upon how it was understood by its
constitutional convention framers, but rather how it was understood by the
people of Missouri who ratified and adopted it. Quoting the court's opinion:
"The only way we can determine what meaning was conveyed to the voters
by the provision is to determine what it means to us, giving the words used
their ordinary and usual meaning." 49 The court further pointed out that while
article III, section 44 prohibits the fixing of interest rates for any particular
group or class, it does not prohibit regulation of different types of lenders or
44. §§ 367.100-.200, 408.100-.220, RSMo 1957 Supp.
45. § 408.100, RSMo 1957 Supp.
46. § 367.110, RSMo 1957 Supp.:
Certificate of registration required, when.-No lender shall engage in
the business of making consumer credit loans as herein defined in this state
of money, credit, goods or things in action without first having obtained a
certificate of registration from the commissioner ....
§ 367.100, RSMo 1957 Supp.:
Definitions.-As used in sections 367.100 to 367.200: (1) 'Consumer
credit loans' shall mean loans for the benefit of or use by an individual or
individuals: . . . (3) 'Lender' shall mean any person engaged in the busi-
ness of making consumer credit loans. A person who makes an occasional
consumer credit loan or who occasionally makes loans but is not regularly
engaged in the business of making consumer credit loans shall not be con-
sidered a lender subject to sections 367.100 to 367.200.
47. Cf. McReynolds, Legislative Remedies Possible Under t e Missouri Cov-
stitution of 1945, 16 Mo. L. Ray. 292, 312-18 (1951).
48. 356 Mo. at 813-14, 203 S.W.2d at 736.
49. Id. at 816, 203 S.W.2d at 737.
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reasonable classification of different types of loans for interest rate deter-
mination.5°
The danger and seriousness of the potentially sweeping effect of article
III, section 44 apparently led Judge Laurence M. Hyde to deliver a pub-
lished concurring opinion further clarifying the matter. He stated:
In construing Section 44, some consideration must be given
to the rest of the Constitution and to general principles of con-
stitutional law. Section 3, Article I, states that the police power
of the state remains exclusively in the people; and Section 3,
Article XI, provides that 'the exercise of the police power of the
state shall never be surrendered.' It is a familiar principle that 'the
state constitution is not a grant of power, but only a limitation, as
far as the legislature is concerned'; and, therefore, except for the
limitations imposed thereby 'the power of a state legislature is un-
limited and practically absolute.'...
Therefore, in determining the meaning and effect of Section
44, it will be helpful to take into consideration what it does not
prohibit as well as what it does. It does not say that no rates of
interest shall be fixed for different classes, kinds or sizes of loans. It
does not say that rates fixed shall be applicable to all borrowers
without regard to the type or classification of loans made to them.
It does not say that no law shall be valid regulating the business
of making loans. And it does not say that no law shall be valid
requiring a license to engage in the business of making loans ...
In other words, Section 44 does not abrogate the police power
of the state to regulate and license the business of lending money.
It only restricts regulation to the extent that it prohibits fixing dif-
ferent interest rates to be charged by different classes of lenders....
but all the rest of the field is as open to the Legislature as it was
before. It may fix different maximum rates for different classes,
kinds and sizes of loans but all lenders may charge the rate fixed for
such loans .... It may require licenses for all engaging in the busi-
ness of lending money or for those making certain classes, kinds or
sizes of loans, so long as it does not make the classification depend
upon the interest rate charged. If the Legislature deems any such
50. Id. at 817, 203 S.W.2d at 738:
Section 44 does not prohibit the enactment of laws authorizing the
formation and regulation of different types of lenders, such as banks, sav-
ings and loan associations, etc. Nor does it prohibit the enactment of laws
providing reasonable classification of loans as to amounts, or otherwise,
with different permissible rates of interest for different types of loans, but
the rates provided for any type of'loans must be available to all lenders
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regulation and licensing necessary for the protection of the public
welfare, Section 44 should not be construed to prevent it.,-
Three judges concurred in this opinion by Judge Hyde.
The question arises whether a retail installment sales or revolving credit
act would conflict with article III, section 44. As mentioned above the Mis-
souri Legislature considered such proposed acts in 1959. Senate Committee
Substitute for Senate Bill No. 97, a proposed "motor vehicles" act con-
taining required licensing and allowable maximum rates for the time price
differential based on a schedule of four classes of time sales determined by
the age of the vehicle, did not fare as well in the House Judiciary Committee
as No. 98, the more complex, companion "all goods other than motor
vehicles" bill with revolving credit act provisions. Surely there are abuses
in motor vehicle sales financing at least equal to that in sales of other goods
and revolving credit financing. Article III, section 44 may have been the
deterrent to No. 97. Certainly required licensing and classification for
maximum rate determination are potential sources of difficulty under article
III, section 44.
Licensing is not absolutely essential to the effectiveness of a retail in-
stallment sales or revolving credit act. The California, Illinois, Nevada, New
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee and Utah acts have no licensing
provisions.
Moreover, required licensing alone is not contrary to article III,
section 44. Both opinions in the Household Finanzwe case recognized that.
In fact, Judge Hyde stated clearly that section 44 shall not be construed to
prevent licensing if the legislature thought it necessary. 2 There is no reason
why required licensing alone should be construed to conflict with article III,
section 44. Required licensing does not prevent uniformity of law-fixed in-
terest rates, applicable generally to all lenders. And even if required licens-
ing may be provided in connection with allowable maximum rates, the
Household Finance case makes it clear that this would not conflict with
section 44 unless there were an absolute tie up between the special license
and the power to charge the favorable maximum rate. The usual licensing
provisions in retail installment sales and revolving credit acts require licens-
ing only for those regularly engaged in the business of "sales finance compa-
51. Id. at 818-19, 203 S.W.2d at 739-40.
52. See the last two sentences of the quote from Judge Hyde's opinion, quoted
in text accompanying note 51 supra.
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ny"53 or "financing institution," not for all who make installment sales or
sell under revolving credit plans.
Certain provisions relating to allowable maximum rates may pose a
greater problem under article III, section 44. The Nebraska "all goods" act
typically provides different allowable maximum rates for sales of motor
vehicles than for sales of other goods, and a schedule of rates for motor
vehicle sales for four classes based upon the age of the vehicle.55 The Honor-
able Clarence S. Beck, Attorney General of Nebraska, rendered an opinion
March 11, 1959511 in which he concluded that this kind of classification for
allowable maximum rate determination was arbitrary and thus repugnant
to the Nebraska constitution, article III, section 18 which prohibits the
legislature from enacting special laws "regulating the interest on money."
Mr. Beck believed that when the legislature undertook to regulate a time
sale it transformed a common law sales transaction into a matter of statutory
regulation dealing with interest on money. Differentiating sales of motor
vehicles from other goods for the determination of allowable maximum rates
was thought unreasonable: Automobiles and certain accessories for them
could be financed at a different allowable maximum rate, and the television
sales financing business had become as much of a social problem as the motor
vehicle sales financing business. Finally the classification of motor vehicle
sales based upon the age of the vehicle was believed to have no reasonable
basis, since age alone has no bearing on the financing risk involved, and the
poorer the buyer, the older the automobile he must buy, and the greater the
time finance charge he must pay In these particulars the Nebraska act be-
came a "special law" in that it did not operate alike upon all sellers or even
all buyers.
It does not seem likely that Missouri's article III, section 40(26), the
no special law-fixing the rate of interest prohibition, would be so applied.sT
The old Small Loan Laws were never invalidated under that prohibition so a
retail installment sales or revolving credit act would hardly be. Moreover,
Attorney General Beck's opinion is based upon the premise that when the
legislature undertakes to regulate the common law time sale transaction, this
becomes in effect statutory regulation dealing with interest on money. By
53. See note 7 supra.
54. See note 8 supra.
55. See note 13 supra.
56. Ops. Ar'ey GEN. OF NEB., Number 43-59 (March 11, 1959).
57. Ross v. City of Kansas City, 328 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. 1959).
[Vol. 25
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virtue of the statutory regulation, what was time price differential becomes
interest on money. This is an over-simplification; either the transaction in-
volves interest on money or it does not, depending upon the basic operative
facts. The legislature cannot change it, at least without specifically saying so.
Even if the time sale charge be deemed interest on money, a classification
of sales of goods for allowable maximum rate determination, differentiating
motor vehicle sales from sales of other goods and motor vehicle sales by
classes based upon the age of the vehicle, would not necessarily conflict with
Missouri's article III, section 44. The opinions in the Household Finance
case make it clear that "reasonable classification of loans as to amounts,
or otherwise, with different permissible rates of interest for different types
of loans" is permitted.5 The legislature "may fix different maximum rates
for different classes, kinds and sizes of loans." 59 So long as the allowable
maximum rates provided are available to all lenders, there is no conflict with
the policy of uniformity of law-fixed interest rates, applicable generally to all
lenders, required by article III, section 44. Installment sales act maximum
rates are based upon a classification of sales. There is no classification of
sellers or financiers as such. Certainly if loans may be classified for interest
rate determination under article III, section 44, so may sales of goods.
Furthermore, if there is any danger in classifying sales of goods to deter-
mine allowable time sale charges, under article III, section 4, a retail in-
stallment sales act need not do so. The allowable maximum rate may be
made the same for all sales of goods. The California and Nevada "motor
vehicles" acts"0 and the Ohio61 and Utah62 "all goods" acts do just that. The
58. See note 50 supra.
59. See the last paragraph of the quote from Judge Hyde's opinion, quoted in
text accompanying note 51 supra.
60. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2982(c) (Supp. 1959); N-v. REV. STAT. § 97.040 (1957):
"The amount of the time price differential ... shall not exceed 1 percent of the un-
paid balance multiplied by the number of months, including any excess fraction
thereof as 1 month, elapsing between the date of such contract and the due date of
the last installment, or $25, whichever is greater ......
61. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1317.06 (Baldwin 1959):
(A) A retail seller at the time of making any retail installment sale
may charge and contract for the payment of a finance charge by the retail
buyer and collect and receive the same, which shall not exceed the rates as
follows:
(1) A base finance charge at the rate of eight dollars per one
hundred dollars per year on the principal balance ...On retail install-
ment contracts providing for principal balance less than, nor not in multi-
ples of one hundred dollars or for installment payments extending for a
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Indiana "all goods" act vests power in the State Department of Financial
Institutions to fix by general order fair maximum finance charges.0 3 Certainly
a statutory classification of sales is not essential for the determination of
allowable maximum rates for time sale charges.
There are those who feel that a revolving credit act providing allowable
maximum rates poses a serious problem under article III, section 44. Certain
people in the consumer credit business believe that a revolving credit
monthly charge is in reality interest on a loan. The buyer might just as
well have borrowed his credit limit" from the seller or holder of the ac-
count,6 5 spent the money on consumer goods, and repaid the "debt" with in-
terest. The revolving credit transaction is said to differ from the typical in-
stallment sale in that (1) there are a group or series of unsecured sales such
that the obligation to pay is not identifiable with any particular goods sold,
(2) the monthly charge is a set per cent on the unpaid balance then due, and
(3) the credit is extended generally rather than for a specific period of time.
All this is said to indicate that the revolving credit financing plan is in
reality a lending transaction. Since a revolving credit act providing an allow-
able maximum monthly charge would then fix a rate of interest for a
particuiar group or class engaged in lending money, it is suggested this would
be in conflict with article III, section 44.
The difficulty with that line of reasoning is that even if the revolving
credit monthly charge be interest and the seller be a "lender," there is
nonetheless no conflict with the policy of uniformity of law-fixed rates of
interest, applicable generally to all lenders, required by article III, section
44. Any lender who wishes to charge the allowed maximum revolving credit
monthly charge may do so if he is in a business where revolving credit financ-
ing is feasible. The fact that a corner shoe shine boy cannot impose that
charge does not conflict with the uniformity required by article III, section
44. Judge Hyde in the Htouselold Finance case stated: "It [art. III, sec. 44]
(2) In addition to the base finance charge, the retail seller may charge
and contract for a service charge of fifty cents per month for the first
fifty dollar unit or fraction thereof, of the principal balance for each month
of the term of the installment contract; and an additional service charge of
twenty-five cents per month for each of the next five fifty dollar units or
fraction thereof, of the principal balance for each month of the term of
the installment contract.
62. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 15-1-2a(B)3 (1953).
63. IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-926 (1951).
64. See note 5 supra.
65. See note 10 supra.
(Vol. 25
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does not say that no rates of interest shall be fixed for different classes, kinds
or sizes of loans. It does not say that rates fixed shall be applicable to all
borrowers without regard to the type or classification of loans made to
them."' 6  Certainly if loans may be classified, so may sales of goods. One
permissible class of sales of goods could reasonably be sales under revolving
credit plan financing. A special allowable maximum rate can be set for that
class of sales.
In addition, it is not at all clear that revolving credit financing is in
reality a lending transaction. It is not even clear that revolving credit
financing is to be distinguished from the typical retail installment sale,
certainly at least as regards article III, section 44. For federal income tax
purposes, a Massachusetts retailer's revolving credit financing was held to
be an "installment plan" within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code
for the purpose of reporting income.67 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
has declared that credit service charges under revolving credit agreement
sales as well as typical installment sales may be excluded from the total
taxable retail price for retailer's excise tax purposes, when the charges are
based bona fide upon the unpaid balance of the selling price due and the
length of time required for its payment, so long as the amounts of such
charges are shown as separate items on the sales slips, statements or in-
voices, and despite the fact that the service charges may exceed the legal
rate of interest."" For these tax purposes, at least, revolving credit financing
is equated to typical installment sales financing. And to reason that a seller
who engages in revolving credit financing is really a "lender" goes too far. He
does not intend to be a lender and the buyer of the consumer goods does
66. See the middle paragraph of the quote from Judge Hyde's opinion, quoted
in text accompanying note 51 supra.
67. Consolidated Dry Goods Co. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 878, 882 (D.
Mass 1960):
Plaintiff's plan ... may have dropped some of the features which had
commonly been found in earlier installment plans, such as retention of a
security interest or the attribution of each payment to the purchase price
of one specific item sold, because such features were impracticable in a
plan designed to cover not a single large sale but a series of transactions
involving numerous smaller items. But it has retained the essential feature
of an arrangement for the payment by the purchaser for the merchandise
sold to him in a series of periodic payments of an agreed part or install-
ment of the debt due. Hence it falls fairly within the meaning of the words
'installment plan' as used in the applicable statutes.
68. Rev. Rul. 57-437, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 717; cf. 12 Psas. F.L.Q. REP. 24
(1957).
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not intend to be a borrower. Both feel that the transaction is simply a
modem sales device.
Neither typical required licensing, provisions establishing allowable
maximum time sale charges nor allowable monthly charge provisions in
revolving credit acts would conflict with article III, section 44. But if there
were any doubt, the words in the constitutional provision must be given their
ordinary and usual meaning" so as to preclude the conflict. Ordinary people
in Missouri ratified and adopted the constitution of 1945, including article
III, section 44. The key words used therein are "interest," "loan," "lending,"
"lenders." It is unreasonable to suppose that ordinary people in Missouri
would believe that installment sales and revolving credit sales plans fit these
key words. Missouri courts apparently still recognize the traditional doctrine
that time sale charges are not "interest" for the purpose of the usury laws.70
Presumably, ordinary people in Missouri would not believe the exact op-
posite.
Moreover, it is a familiar rule of statutory construction that when one
construction of a statute will make it unconstitutional and another con-
struction will make it constitutional, the latter will be made if it is reason-
able.71 Retail installment sales and revolving credit acts could certainly
reasonably be construed as not involving "interest," "loan," "lending" or
"lenders." The term "interest," for instance, hardly fits. "Webster's Un-
abridged Dictionary defines the word 'interest' as follows: 'A rate per cent
of money paid for the use of money or the forbearance of demanding pay-
ment of a debt.' ",72 "The theory of interest in any case is compensation for
the use of or loss of the use of money to the person entitled to it."13 Under
these definitions the seller must be entitled to full payment from the buyer at
the time of the sale in order to forbear "demanding payment of a debt," or
be entitled to the money so as to be due compensation for its loss of use. The
seller cannot sell his goods on a deferred payment contract basis; he must
sell them for "cash," which, since not paid, raises the immediate total debt
due from the buyer to the seller. The buyer and seller are precluded from
69. See note 49 supra.
70. Willard, Finance Charges or Time Price Differential in Installment Sales-
Usury?, 24 Mo. L. REv. 225, 229-31 (1959); cf. note 26 supra.
71. City of Joplin v. Industrial Comm'n, 329 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Mo. 1959)
(en banc).
72. Lewis v. Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 247 Ky. 301, 304, 57 S.W.2d
8, 10 (1933).
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contracting for anything but an immediate total debtor-creditor relationship.
The seller can only sell on that basis. Certainly this is not the ordinary
person's understanding of installment sale transactions. It is an unreason-
able construction which twists typical installment sale or revolving credit
financing transactions into immediate total debtor-creditor relationships so
that "interest" is due from the buyer.
In Deputy v. Du Pont,74 the Supreme Court of the United States held
that certain payments made to lenders of stock by the taxpayer-borrower
stockholder, in amount equal to the dividends on the borrowed shares plus
a sum equal to the lender's income tax on such payments, were not deduct-
ible under the Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 23(b).75 The Court, per Mr.
Justice Douglas, stated:
There remains respondent's contention that these payments
are deductible under § 23(b) as 'interest paid or accrued . . . on
indebtedness.' Clearly respondent owed an obligation . . . . But
although an indebtedness is an obligation, an obligation is not
necessarily an 'indebtedness' within the meaning of § 23(b). Nor are
all carrying charges 'interest.' In Old Colony R. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 284 U.S. 552, this Court had before it the meaning of the
word 'interest' as used in the comparable provision of the 1921 Act
.... It said, p. 560, '. . . as respects "interest," the usual import
of the term is the amount which one has contracted to pay for the
use of borrowed money.' It there rejected the contention . . . that
'Congress used the word having in mind any concept other than
the usual, ordinary and everyday meaning of the term.' p. 561. It
refused to assume that the Congress used the term with reference
to 'some esoteric concept derived from subtle and theoretic analysis.'
p. 561.
We likewise refuse to make that assumption here. It is not
enough, as urged by respondent, that 'interest' or 'indebtedness' in
their original classical context may have permitted this broader
meaning .... 76
Following Deputy v. Du Pont, F. A. Gillespie & Sons Co. v. Commissioner77
held that, where two individual Gillespies by contract transferred properties
to the taxpayer in return for annuities annually for life, the taxpayer could
74. 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
75. 45 Stat. 791 (1928).
76. 308 U.S. at 497-98.
77. 154 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1946).
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not deduct a portion of the annuity payments, equal to 31% of what it would
have cost to purchase such annuities, as "interest." No part of the annuity
payments was interest in the ordinary meaning of that term. All of the
annuity payments were part of the consideration paid for the properties
conveyed.
True these two cases involve interpretation of the word "interest" for
purposes of the income tax laws. But the courts talk about the word "in-
terest" in its ordinary meaning. So used "interest" means something narrower
than any and all costs or carrying charges arising from some "obligation."
The ordinary meaning of "interest" would similarly not include time sale
charges under retail installment sales and revolving credit contract obliga-
tions. Although the recently introduced Douglas Bill7 8 purports to lump
together all kinds of credit charges and to require that they be stated "in
terms of simple annual interest," the ordinary meaning of the word "interest"
has not so changed to encompass generally the contract concept of "time sale
charge." Only "some esoteric concept [of interest] derived from subtle and
theoretic analysis" could do that. Certainly the word "interest" in article III,
section 44 could not be so broadly construed to invalidate a retail installment
sales or revolving credit act.
No other state has a constitutional provision quite like article III,
section 44. A number of other states with constitutional provisions like
Missouri's article III, section 40(26), prohibiting special laws fixing or reg-
ulating interest on money, have some kind of retail installment sales act:
California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska [although Attorney General Beck ques-
tions its validity under this constitutional prohibition as mentioned above],
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Utah.7 0 A number
of the acts in these states contain required licensing provisions (Colorado,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Mex-
ico and Pennsylvania) and classifications of sales of goods for allowable
rate determination (Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon and Pennsylvania).
78. S. REP. No. 2755, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), introduced by Senator
Douglas and others.
79. CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 25; COLO. CONsT. art. V, § 25; ILL. CONST. art. IV,
§ 22; IND. CONsT. art. IV, § 22; Ky. CoNsT. § 59; LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4; MINN.
CONsT. art. IV, § 33; Miss. CONsT. art. IV, § 90; MoNT. CONsT. art. V, § 26; NED.
CONST. art. III,§ 18; N.M. CONsT. art. IV, § 24; N.D. CONST. art. II, § 69; ORE.
CONsT. art. IV, § 23; PA. CONST. art. III, § 7; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 26.
(Vol. 25
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One state, Tennessee, has a constitutional provision somewhat similar
to Missouri's article III, section 44. Article XI, section 7 of the Tennessee
constitution provides:
The Legislature shall fix the rate of interest, and the rate so
established shall be equal and uniform throughout the State; but
the Legislature may provide for a conventional rate of interest, not
to exceed ten per centum per annum.
This provision has been interpreted to mean that the legislature should
provide by a general law, operative alike upon all, and throughout the
entire state, for a uniform and equal rate of interest.8 0 This has virtually
the same meaning as the policy of uniformity of law-fixed rates of in-
terest, applicable generally to all lenders, required by Missouri's article III,
section 44. The Tennessee constitutional provision is not violated by a
small loan act which fixes a uniform interest rate and a maximum allowable
expense fee, such fee being determinable by agreement between the parties
within the maximum, unless unreasonably high.,,
In this state of the law, Tennessee has an "all goods other than motor
vehicles" act with revolving credit act provisions.82 The Tennessee lawmakers
apparently believe their act is not in conflict with the constitutional pro-
vision simliar in effect to Missouri's. It may be significant however that the
Tennessee act contains no licensing provisions and no classification of sales
for allowable rate determination. However, the allowable time price differen-
tial for revolving credit is 15 cents per $10.00 per month, computed from
month to month, despite the constitutional limitation of "a conventional
rate of interest, not to exceed ten per centum per annum." The Tennessee
lawmakers apparently believe the revolving credit time price differential is
something other than "interest."
In conclusion, without intending to express any opinion as to the
wisdom or need for such acts in Missouri, reasonably drafted retail in-
stallment sales and revolving credit acts would not conflict with article III,
section 44. Of course, some care must be taken in drafting licensing and
maximum allowable rate provisions. An absolute tie up between the special
80. Caldwell & Co. v. Lea, 152 Tenn. 48, 272 S.W. 715 (1925); McKinney v.
Memphis Overton Hotel Co., 59 Tenn. 104 (1873).
81. Koen v. State, 162 Tenn. 573, 39 S.W.2d 283 (1931); Pugh v. Hermitage
Loan Co., 167 Tenn. 389, 70 S.W.2d 22 (1934); Family Loan Co. v. Hickerson, 168
Tenn. 36, 73 S.W.2d 694 (1934).
82. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1901 to -1910 (Supp. 1959).
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license and the power to charge the higher rates must be avoided. Beyond
that limitation, article III, section 44 would have little force and effect
as to these kinds of acts. A uniform rate would of course be the safest,
but even a classification of sales scheme like any of those used in the acts
considered herein would not conflict with the policy of uniformity of law-
fixed interest rates, applicable generally to all lenders, required by article
III, section 44. A legislative declaration explaining reasons for the classifica-
tion would further protect its validity1s Article III, section 44 is an un-
usual provision, a kind of worrisome thing, but it does not mean much in
the final analysis. As Judge Hyde pointed out in the Household Finance
case, it does not abrogate the police power of the State of Missouri."
83. Attorney General Beck of Nebraska could find no reason for the classifi-
cations made in the Nebraska "all goods" act.
84. See the first and last paragraphs of the quote from Judge Hyde's opinion,
quoted in text accompanying note 51 supra.
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